The emerging technologies for large scale data analysis raise new challenges to the security and privacy of sensitive user data. In this work we investigate the problem of private statistical analysis of time-series data in the distributed and semi-honest setting. In particular, we study some properties of Private Stream Aggregation (PSA), first introduced by Shi et al. 2017. This is a computationally secure protocol for the collection and aggregation of data in a distributed network and has a very small communication cost. In the non-adaptive query model, a secure PSA scheme can be built upon any key-homomorphic weak pseudo-random function as shown by Valovich 2017, yielding security guarantees in the standard model which is in contrast to Shi et. al. We show that every mechanism which preserves pǫ, δq-differential privacy in effect preserves computational pǫ, δq-differential privacy when it is executed through a secure PSA scheme. Furthermore, we introduce a novel perturbation mechanism based on the symmetric Skellam distribution that is suited for preserving differential privacy in the distributed setting, and find that its performances in terms of privacy and accuracy are comparable to those of previous solutions. On the other hand, we leverage its specific properties to construct a computationally efficient prospective post-quantum protocol for differentially private time-series data analysis in the distributed model. The security of this protocol is based on the hardness of a new variant of the Decisional Learning with Errors (DLWE) problem. In this variant the errors are taken from the symmetric Skellam distribution. We show that this new variant is hard based on the hardness of the standard Learning with Errors (LWE) problem where the errors are taken from the discrete Gaussian distribution. Thus, we provide a variant of the LWE problem that is hard based on conjecturally hard lattice problems and uses a discrete error distribution that is similar to the continuous Gaussian distribution in that it is closed under convolution. A consequent feature of the constructed prospective post-quantum protocol is the use of the same noise for security and for differential privacy.
Introduction
Among several challenges that the society is facing in the era of big data, the problem of data processing under strong privacy and security guarantees receives a lot of attention in research communities. The framework of statistical disclosure control aims at providing strong privacy guarantees for the records stored in a database while enabling accurate statistical analyses to be performed. In recent years, differential privacy has become one of the most important paradigms for privacy-preserving statistical analyses. According to K. Nissim, a pioneer in this area of research, "there is a great promise for the marriage of Big Data and Differential Privacy". 1 It combines mathematically rigorous privacy guarantees with highly accurate analyses over larger data sets. Generally, the notion of differential privacy is considered in the centralised setting where we assume the existence of a trusted curator (see Blum et al. [8] , Dwork [14] , Dwork et al. [16] , McSherry and Talwar [24] ) who collects data in the clear, aggregates and perturbs it properly (e.g. by adding Laplace noise) and publishes it. In this way, the output statistics are not significantly influenced by the presence (resp. absence) of a particular record in the database. In this work we study how to preserve differential privacy when we cannot rely on a trusted curator. In this so-called distributed setting, the users have to send their own data to an untrusted aggregator. Preserving differential privacy and achieving high accuracy in the distributed setting is of course harder than in the centralised setting, since the users have to execute a perturbation mechanism on their own. In order to achieve the same accuracy as provided by well-known techniques in the centralised setting, Shi et al. [32] introduce the Private Stream Aggregation (PSA) scheme, a cryptographic protocol enabling each user to securely send encrypted time-series data to an aggregator. The aggregator is then able to decrypt the aggregate of all data in each time-step, but cannot retrieve any further information about the individual data. Using such a protocol, the task of perturbation can be split among the users, such that computational differential privacy, a notion first introduced by Mironov et al. [27] , is preserved and high accuracy is guaranteed. For a survey of applications of this protocol, we refer to [32] .
Related Work. In [32] , a PSA scheme for sum queries was provided that satisfies strong security guarantees under the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption. However, this instantiation has some limitations. First, the security only holds in the random oracle model; second, its decryption algorithm requires the solution of the discrete logarithm in a given range, which can be very timeconsuming if the number of users and the plaintext space are large. Third, a connection between the security of a PSA scheme and computational differential privacy is not explicitly shown. In a subsequent work by Chan et al. [10] , this connection is still not completely established, since the polynomial-time reduction between an attacker against a secure PSA scheme and a database distinguisher is missing.
By lowering the requirements of Aggregator Obliviousness introduced in [32] by abrogating the attacker's possibility to adaptively compromise users during the execution of a PSA scheme with time-series data, Valovich [36] shows that a PSA scheme achieving this lower security level can be built upon any keyhomomorphic weak pseudo-random function. Since weak pseudo-randomness can be achieved in the standard model, this condition also enables secure schemes in the standard model. Furthermore, an instantiation of this result based on the DDH assumption was given in [36] , where decryption is always efficient. Joye and Libert [21] provide a protocol with the same security guarantees in the random oracle model as in [32] . The security of their scheme relies on the DCR assumption (rather than DDH as in [32] ) and as a result, in the security reduction they can remove a factor which is cubic in the number of users. However, their scheme involves a semi-trusted party for setting some public parameters. In this work, we provide an instantiation of the generic PSA construction from [36] which relies on the DLWE assumption. While in this generic security reduction a linear factor in the number of users cannot be avoided, our construction does not involve any trusted party and has security guarantees in the standard model. In a subsequent work [7] , a generalisation of the scheme from [21] is obtained based on smooth projective hash functions (see [12] ). This generalisation allows the construction of secure protocols based on various hardness assumptions. However, the dependencies on a semi-trusted party (for most of the instantiations) and on a random oracle remain.
Contributions. In this regard, our results are as follows. First, reduction-based security proofs for cryptographic schemes usually require an attacker in the corresponding security game to send two different plaintexts (or plaintext collections) to a challenger. The adversary receives then back a ciphertext which is the encryption of one of these collections and has to guess which one it is. In any security definition for a PSA scheme, these collections must satisfy a particular requirement, i.e. they must lead to the same aggregate, since the attacker has the capability to decrypt the aggregate (different aggregates would make the adversary's task trivial). In general, however, this requirement cannot be satisfied in the context of differential privacy. Introducing a novel kind of security reduction which deploys a biased coin flip, we show that, whenever a randomised perturbation procedure is involved in a PSA scheme, the requirement of having collections with equal aggregate can be abolished. This result can be generalised to any cryptographic scheme with such a requirement. Using this property, we are able to show that if a mechanism preserves differential privacy, then it preserves computational differential privacy when it is used as a randomised perturbation procedure in a PSA scheme. This provides the missing step in the analysis from [32] .
Second, we introduce the Skellam mechanism that uses the symmetric Skellam distribution and compare it with the geometric mechanism by Ghosh et al. [17] and the binomial mechanism by Dwork et al. [15] . All three mechanisms preserve differential privacy and make use of discrete probability distributions. Therefore, they are well-suited for an execution through a PSA scheme. For generating the right amount of noise among all users, these mechanisms apply two different approaches. While in the geometric mechanism, with high probability, only one user generates the noise necessary for differential privacy, the binomial and Skellam mechanisms allow all users to generate noise of small variance, that sums up to the required value for privacy by the reproducibility property of the binomial and the Skellam distributions. We show that the theoretical error bound of the Skellam mechanism is comparable to the other two. At the same time, we provide experimental results showing that the geometric and Skellam mechanisms have a comparable accuracy in practice, while beating the one of the binomial mechanism. The advantage of the Skellam mechanism is that, based on the previously mentioned results, it can be used it to construct the first secure, prospective post-quantum PSA scheme for sum queries that automatically preserves computational differential privacy. The corresponding weak pseudorandom function for this protocol is constructed from the Learning with Errors (LWE) problem that received a lot of attention in the cryptographic research community in recent years. As an instance of the LWE problem we are given a uniformly distributed matrix A P Z λˆκ q and a noisy codeword y " Ax`e P Z λ q with an error term e P Z λ q chosen from a proper error distribution χ λ and an unknown x P Z κ q . The task is to find the correct vector x. In the decisional version of this problem (DLWE problem) we are given pA, yq and have to decide whether y " Ax`e or y is a uniformly distributed vector in Z λ q . Regev [31] provided a search-to-decision reduction to show that the two problems are essentially equivalent in the worst case and Micciancio and Mol [26] provided a sample preserving search-to-decision reduction for certain cases showing the equivalence in the average case. Moreover, in [31] the average-case-hardness of the search problem was established by the construction of an efficient quantum algorithm for worst-case lattice problems using an efficient solver of the LWE problem if the error distribution χ is a discrete Gaussian distribution. Accordingly, most cryptographic applications of the LWE problem used a discrete Gaussian error distribution for their constructions. We will take advantage of the reproducibility of the Skellam distribution for our DLWE-based PSA scheme by using errors following the symmetric Skellam distribution rather than the discrete Gaussian distribution, which is not reproducible. The result is that the sum of the errors generated by every user to secure their data is also a Skellam variable and therefore sufficient for preserving differential privacy. Hence, we show the average-case-hardness of the LWE problem with errors drawn from the Skellam distribution. Our proof is inspired by techniques used by Döttling and Müller-Quade [13] where a variant of the LWE problem with uniform errors on a small support is shown to be hard. 2 Consequently, we obtain a lattice-based secure PSA scheme for analysing sum queries under differential privacy where the noise is used both for security and for preserving differential privacy at once.
Other Related Work. Another series of works deals with a distributed generation of noise for preserving differential privacy. Dwork et al. [15] consider the Gaussian distribution for splitting the task of noise generation among all users. Their proposed scheme requires more interactions between the users than our solution.Ács and Castelluccia [2] apply privacy-preserving data aggregation to smart metering. The generation of Laplace noise is performed in a distributed manner, since each meter simply generates the difference of two Gamma distributed random variables as a share of a Laplace distributed random variable. In the work [30] each user generates a share of Laplace noise by generating a vector of four Gaussian random variables. For a survey of the mechanisms given in [30] and [2] , we refer to [19] . However, the aforementioned mechanisms generate noise drawn according to continuous distributions, but for the use in a PSA scheme discrete noise is required. Therefore, we consider proper discrete distributions and compare their performances in private statistical analyses.
Preliminaries
Notation 1 For a natural number n, we denote by rns the interval t1, . . . , nu. Notation 2 Let X be a set. If X is finite, we denote by UpXq the uniform distribution on X. Let χ be a distribution on X. We denote by x Ð χ (or sometimes x Ð χpXq) the sampling of x from X according to χ. If X has only two elements, we write x Ð R X instead of x Ð UpXq. If A Ð χ aˆb (or A Ð χpX aˆb q) then A is an aˆb-matrix constructed by picking every entry independently from X according to the distribution χ.
Notation 3
Let κ be a security parameter. If ω " ωpκq ă 1{polypκq for every polynomial poly and all κ ą κ 1 , for some κ 1 P N, then we say that ω is negligible in κ and denote it by ω " negpκq. If ω is non-negligible in κ (i.e. if ω ą 1{polypκq), then we write ω ą negpκq.
Notation 4
Let q ą 2 be a prime. We handle elements from Z q as their central residue-class representation. This means that x 1 P Z q is identified with x " x 1 mod q for x P t´pq´1q{2, . . . , pq´1q{2u thereby lifting x 1 from Z q to Z.
Problem statement
In this work we consider a distributed and semi-honest setting where n users are asked to participate in some statistical analyses but do not trust the data analyst (or aggregator), who is assumed to be honest but curious. Therefore, the users cannot provide their own data in the clear. Moreover, they communicate solely and independently with the untrusted aggregator, who wants to analyse the users data by means of time-series queries and aims at obtaining answers as accurate as possible. More specifically, assume that the data items belong to a data universe D. For a sequence of time-steps t P T , where T is a discrete time period, the analyst sends queries which are answered by the users in a distributed manner. Each query is modelled as a function f : D n Ñ O for a finite or countably infinite set of possible outputs (i.e. answers to the query) O. We also assume that some users may act in order to compromise the privacy of the other participants. More precisely, we assume the existence of a publicly known constant γ P p0, 1s which is the a priori estimate of the lower bound on the fraction of uncompromised users who honestly follow the protocol and want to release useful information about their data (with respect to a particular query f ), while preserving pǫ, δq-differential privacy. The remaining p1´γq-fraction of users is assumed to be compromised and following the protocol but aiming at violating the privacy of uncompromised users. For that purpose, these users form a coalition with the analyst and send her auxiliary information, e.g. their own data in the clear. For computing the answers to the aggregator's queries, a special cryptographic protocol, called Private Stream Aggregation (PSA) scheme, is used by all users. In contrast to common secure multi-party techniques (see [18] , [23] ), this protocol requires each user to send only one message per query to the analyst. In connection with a differentially private mechanism, a PSA scheme assures that the analyst is only able to learn a noisy aggregate of users' data (as close as possible to the real answer) and nothing else. Specifically, for preserving pǫ, δq-differential privacy, it would be sufficient to add a single copy of (properly distributed) noise Y to the aggregated statistics. Since we cannot add such noise once the aggregate has been computed, the users have to generate and add noise to their original data in such a way that the sum of the errors has the same distribution as Y . For this purpose, we see two different approaches. In the first one, with small probability a user adds noise sufficient to preserve the privacy of the entire statistics. This probability is calibrated in such a way only one of the n users is actually expected to add noise at all. Shi et al. [32] investigate this method using the geometric mechanism from. [17] . In the second approach, each user generates noise of small variance, such that the sum of all noisy terms suffices to preserve differential privacy of the aggregate. To achieve this goal, we need a discrete probability distribution which is closed under convolution and is known to provide differential privacy. The binomial mechanism from [15] and the Skellam mechanism introduced in this work serve these purposes. 3 Since the protocol used for the data transmission is computationally secure, the entire mechanism preserves a computational version of differential privacy as it will be shown in Section 4.
Definitions
Differential Privacy. We consider a database as an element D P D n with data universe D and number of users n. Since D may contain sensitive infor-mation, the users want to protect their privacy. Therefore, a privacy-preserving mechanism must be applied. We will always assume that a mechanism is applied in the distributed setting. Differential privacy is a well-established notion for privacy-preserving statistical analyses. We recall that a randomised mechanism preserves differential privacy if its application on two adjacent databases (databases differing in one entry only) leads to close distributions of the outputs.
Definition 1 (Differential Privacy [16] ) Let R be a (possibly infinite) set and let n P N. A randomised mechanism A : D n Ñ R preserves pǫ, δq-differential privacy (short: DP), if for all adjacent databases D 0 , D 1 P D n and all measurable R Ď R:
PrrApD 0 q P Rs ď e ǫ¨P rrApD 1 q P Rs`δ.
The probability space is defined over the randomness of A.
The additional parameter δ is necessary for mechanisms which cannot preserve ǫ-DP (i.e. pǫ, 0q-DP) for certain cases. However, if the probability that these cases occur is bounded by δ, then the mechanism preserves pǫ, δq-DP.
In the literature, there are well-established mechanisms for preserving differential privacy, e.g. the Laplace mechanism from [16] and the Exponential mechanism from [24] . In order to privately evaluate a query, these mechanisms draw error terms according to some distribution depending on the query's global sensitivity.
Definition 2 (Global Sensitivity)
The global sensitivity Spf q of a query f :
In particular, we will consider sum queries f D : D n Ñ Z defined as f D pDq :" ř n i"1 d i , for D " pd 1 , . . . , d n q P D n and D Ď Z. For measuring how well the output of a mechanism estimates the real data with respect to a particular query, we use the notion of pα, βq-accuracy.
Definition 3 (Accuracy) The output of a mechanism A achieves pα, βq-accuracy for a query f : D n Ñ R if for all D P D n :
The use of a cryptographic protocol for transferring data provides a computational security level. If such a protocol is applied to preserve DP, this implies that only a computational level of DP can be provided. The definition of computational differential privacy was first provided in [27] and subsequently extended in [10] .
Definition 4 (Computational Differential Privacy [10])
Let κ be a security parameter and n P N with n " polypκq. A randomised mechanism A : D n Ñ R preserves computational pǫ, δq-differential privacy (short: CDP), if for all adjacent databases D 0 , D 1 P D n and all probabilistic polynomial-time distinguishers D CDP :
where negpκq is a negligible function in κ. The probability space is defined over the randomness of A and D CDP .
The notion of CDP is a natural computational indistinguishability-extension of the information-theoretical definition. The advantage is that preserving differential privacy only against bounded attackers helps to substantially reduce the error of the answer provided by the mechanism.
Private Stream Aggregation. We define the Private Stream Aggregation scheme and give a security definition for it. Thereby, we mostly follow the concepts introduced in [32], though we deviate in a few points. A PSA scheme is a protocol for safe distributed time-series data transfer which enables the receiver (here: the untrusted analyst) to learn nothing else than the sums ř n i"1 x i,j for j " 1, 2, . . ., where x i,j is the value of the ith participant in time-step j and n is the number of participants (or users). Such a scheme needs a key exchange protocol for all n users together with the analyst as a precomputation (e.g. using multi-party techniques), and requires each user to send exactly one message in each time-step j " 1, 2, . . ..
Definition 5 (Private Stream Aggregation [32])
Let κ be a security parameter, D a set and n " polypκq, λ " polypκq. A Private Stream Aggregation (PSA) scheme Σ " pSetup, PSAEnc, PSADecq is defined by three ppt algorithms: Setup: ppp, T, s 0 , s 1 , . . . , s n q Ð Setupp1 κ q with public parameters pp, T " tt 1 , . . . , t λ u and secret keys s i for all i " 1, . . . , n. PSAEnc: For t j P T and all i " 1, . . . , n: c i,j Ð PSAEnc si pt j , x i,j q for x i,j P D. PSADec: Compute ř n i"1 x 1 i,j " PSADec s0 pt j , c 1,j , . . . , c n,j q for t j P T and ciphers c 1,j , . . . , c n,j . For all t j P T and x 1,j , . . . , x n,j P D the following holds:
PSADec s0 pt j , PSAEnc s1 pt j , x 1,j q, . . . , PSAEnc sn pt j , x n,j"
The Setup-phase has to be carried out just once and for all, and can be performed with a secure multi-party protocol among all users and the analyst. In all other phases, no communication between the users is needed. The system parameters pp are public and constant for all time-steps with the implicit understanding that they are used in Σ. Every user encrypts her value x i,j with her own secret key s i and sends the ciphertext to the analyst. If the analyst receives the ciphertexts of all users in a time-step t j , it computes the aggregate with the decryption key s 0 . For a particular time-step, let the users' values be of the form x i,j " d i,j`ei,j , i " 1, . . . , n, where d i,j P D is the original data of the user i and e i,j is her error term. 4 It is reasonable to assume that e i,j " 0 for the p1´γq¨n compromised users, since this can only increase their chances to infer some information about the uncompromised users. There is no privacy-breach if only one user adds the entirely needed noise (first approach) or if the uncompromised users generate noise of low variance (second approach), since the single values x i,j are encrypted and the analyst cannot learn anything about them, except for their aggregate.
Security. Since our model allows the analyst to compromise users, the aggregator can obtain auxiliary information about the data of the compromised users or their secret keys. Even then a secure PSA scheme should release no more information than the aggregate of the uncompromised users' data. Informally, a PSA scheme Σ is secure if every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm, with knowledge of the analyst's and compromised users' keys and with adaptive encryption queries, has only negligible advantage in distinguishing between the encryptions of two databases p D 0 , p D 1 of its choice with equal aggregates. We can assume that an adversary knows the secret keys of the entire compromised coalition. If the protocol is secure against such an attacker, then it is also secure against an attacker without the knowledge of every key from the coalition. Thus, in our security definition we consider the most powerful adversary.
Definition 6 (Non-adaptive Aggregator Obliviousness cite111)
Let κ be a security parameter. Let T be a ppt adversary for a PSA scheme Σ " pSetup, PSAEnc, PSADecq and let D be a set. We define a security game between a challenger and the adversary T .
Setup. The challenger runs the Setup algorithm on input security parameter
κ and returns public parameters pp, public encryption parameters T with |T | " λ " polypκq and secret keys s 0 , s 1 , . . . , s n . It sends κ, pp, T, s 0 to T . T chooses U Ď rns and sends it to the challenger which returns ps i q iPrnszU . Queries. The challenger flips a random bit b Ð R t0, 1u. T is allowed to query pi, t j , x i,j q with i P U, t j P T, x i,j P D and the challenger returns c i,j Ð PSAEnc si pt j , x i,j q. Challenge. T chooses t j˚P T such that no encryption query with t j˚w as made. (If there is no such t j˚t hen the challenger simply aborts.) T queries two different tuples px
Queries. T is allowed to make the same type of queries as before restricted to encryption queries with t j ‰ t j˚. Guess. T outputs a guess about b.
The adversary's probability to win the game (i.e. to guess b correctly) is 1{2ν pκq. A PSA scheme is non-adaptively aggregator oblivious or achieves non-adaptive Aggregator Obliviousness (AO2), if there is no ppt adversary T with advantage νpκq ą negpκq in winning the game.
Encryption queries are made only for i P U , since knowing the secret key for all i P rnszU the adversary can encrypt a value autonomously. If encryption queries in time-step tj were allowed, then no deterministic scheme would be aggregator oblivious. The adversary T can determine the original data of all i P rnszU for every time-step, since it knows ps i q iPrnszU . Then T can compute the aggregate of the uncompromised users' data. Definition 6 differs from the definition of Aggregator Obliviousness from [32] in that we require the adversary to specify the set U of uncompromised users before making any query, i.e. we do not allow the adversary to determine U adaptively. In light of that and in analogy to the definitions of security against adaptive (CCA1) and non-adaptive (CCA2) chosen ciphertext adversaries, we refer to the security definition from [32] as AO1 and to our security definition as AO2. In this work we simply call a PSA scheme secure if it achieves AO2.
Weak PRF. In the analysis of the secure protocol, we make use of the following definition.
Definition 7 (Weak PRF [28]) Let κ be a security parameter. Let A, B, C be sets with sizes parameterised by a complexity parameter κ. A family of functions
F " tF a | F a : B Ñ Cu aPA is called a weak PRF family, if for all ppt algorithms D Op¨q PRF with oracle access to Op¨q (where Op¨q P tF a p¨q, randp¨qu) on any polynomial number of uniformly chosen inputs, we have:
where a Ð UpAq and rand P tf | f : B Ñ Cu is a random mapping from B to C.
Main Result
In this work we prove the following result by showing the connection between a key-homomorphic weak pseudo-random function and a differentially private mechanism for sum queries.
Theorem 1 Let ǫ ą 0, w ă w 1 P Z, m, n P N with maxt|w|, |w 1 |u ă m. Let D " tw, . . . , w 1 u and f D be a sum query. If there exist groups G 1 Ď G, a keyhomomorphic weak pseudo-random function family mapping into G 1 and an efficiently computable and efficiently invertible mn-isomorphic embedding ϕ : t´mn, . . . , mnu Ñ G, then there exists an efficient mechanism for f D that preserves pǫ, δq-CDP for any 0 ă δ ă 1 with an error bound of OpSpf D q{ǫ¨logp1{δqq and requires each user to send exactly one message.
The proof of Theorem 1 is provided in the next two sections. In Section 4 we recall from [36] how to construct a general PSA scheme from a key-homomorphic weak PRF. Subsequently, we show that a secure PSA scheme in composition with a DP-mechanism preserves CDP. In Section 5, based on the DLWE problem with errors drawn from a Skellam distribution, we provide an instantiation of a key-homomorphic weak PRF. This yields a concrete efficient PSA scheme that automatically embeds a DP-mechanism with accuracy as stated in Theorem 1.
From Key-Homomorphic Weak PRF to CDP
We give a condition for the existence of secure PSA schemes and then analyse its connection to CDP.
From Key-Homomorphic Weak PRF to secure PSA
Now we state the condition for the existence of secure PSA schemes for sum queries in the sense of Definition 6.
Theorem 2 (Weak PRF gives secure PSA scheme [36] ) Let κ be a security parameter, and m, n P N with logpmq " polypκq, n " polypκq. Let pG,¨q, pS,˚q be finite groups and G 1 Ď G. For some finite set M , let F " tF s | F s : M Ñ G 1 u sPS be a (possibly randomised) weak PRF family and let ϕ : t´mn, . . . , mnu Ñ G be a mapping. Then the following PSA scheme Σ " pSetup, PSAEnc, PSADecq achieves AO2:
The keys are s i Ð UpSq for all i P rns with s 0 " p˚n i"1 s i q´1 and T Ă M such that all t j P T are chosen uniformly at random from M ,
Moreover, if F contains only deterministic functions that are homomorphic over S, if ϕ is homomorphic and injective over t´mn, . . . , mnu and if the c i,j are encryptions of the x i,j , then V j " ř n i"1 x i,j , i.e. then PSADec correctly decrypts
The reason for not including the correctness property in the main statement is that in Section 5 we will provide an example of a secure PSA scheme based on the DLWE problem that does not have a fully correct decryption algorithm, but a noisy one. This noise is necessary for establishing the security of the protocol and will be also used for preserving the differential privacy of the decryption output. Hence, we need a key-homomorphic weak PRF and a mapping which homomorphically aggregates all users' data. Since every data value is at most m, the scheme correctly retrieves the aggregate, which is at most m¨n. Importantly, the product of all pseudo-random values F s0 ptq, F s1 ptq, . . . , F sn ptq is the neutral element in the group G for all t P T . Since the values in T are uniformly distributed in M , it is enough to require that F is a weak PRF family. Thus, the statement of Theorem 2 does not require a random oracle.
From secure PSA to CDP
In this section, we describe how to preserve CDP using a PSA scheme. Specifically, let A be a mechanism which, given some event Good, evaluates a statistical query f : D n Ñ O over a database D P D n preserving ǫ-DP. Furthermore, let Σ be a PSA scheme for f that achieves AO2 (or AO1). We show how A executed through Σ preserves ǫ-CDP given Good. Assume Prr Goods ď δ. We show that A preserves pǫ, δq-CDP unconditionally if executed through Σ. For simplicity, in this section we focus on sum queries, but our analysis can be easily extended to more general statistical queries.
Redefining the security of PSA. Let us first modify the security game in Definition 6 in the following way. Let game 1 be the original game from Definition 6. Let p P p0, 1q and P " maxtp, 1´pu. The P -game 1 for a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary T 1,P is defined as game 1 with the following changes:
-Before the challenge phase, T 1,P sends p to the challenger. -In the challenge phase, the challenger chooses b " 0 with probability p and b " 1 with probability 1´p.
We call a PSA scheme P -secure if the probability of every probabilistic polynomialtime adversary T 1,P in winning the above game is P`negpκq. Note that game 1 is a special case of P -game 1, where P " 1{2. We refer to this case as the unbiased version (rather the biased version if P ą 1{2) of P -game 1. In the unbiased case, we just drop the dependence on P and the adversary is not required to send p to its challenger. The reason for introducing P -game 1 is that in the context of differential privacy it is very unlikely to have equal aggregates of the two plaintext collections in the challenge phase of the original game, since the data is perturbed by a differentially private mechanism. The use of a bias towards one of the collections will balance the incorporation of noise as we show below.
Constructing a PSA adversary using a CDP adversary. Security game for adjacent databases. For showing that a P -secure PSA scheme is suitable for preserving CDP, we have to construct a successful adversary in P -game 1 (with a proper choice of p) using a successful distinguisher for adjacent databases. We define the following game 0 for a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary T 0 which is identical to game 1 with a changed challenge-phase:
Challenge. T 0 chooses t˚P T with no encryption query made at t˚. T 0 queries two adjacent tuples pd 
We now define an experiment Exp 2 and show its statistical equivalence to Exp 1 .
-Let Y be a random variable as in Exp 1 .
-Let p " PrrB 1{2 " 0|Y " ys. Let B p be a Bernoulli variable with PrrB p " 0s " p. -Let p X 2 be a random vector with probability function
Here b is a realisation of B p and ½pyq " ½ tzPO|z"f x 
The simple proof of Lemma 3 is found in Section A of the appendix. Note: Lemma 3 also holds for the marginals of pB 1{2 , p
The Reduction. With Lemma 3 in mind, we can show that a successful adversary in game 0 yields a successful adversary in P -game 1 for a particular P P r1{2, 1q. Afterwards we show that a successful adversary in P -game 1 for any P P r1{2, 1q yields a successful adversary in game 1.
Lemma 4
Let κ be a security parameter. Let T 0 be an adversary in game 0 with advantage µ 0 pκq ą negpκq. Let B 1{2 denote the random variable describing the challenge bit b in game 0 and let Y denote the random variable describing the aggregate of px rbs i q iPU . Let p be the probability of B 1{2 " 0 given the choice of Y and let P " maxtp, 1´pu. Then there exists an adversary T 1,P in P -game 1 with advantage µ 1,P pκq ą negpκq.
Proof. We construct a successful adversary T 1,P in P -game 1 using T 0 as follows:
Setup. Receive κ, pp, T, s 0 from the P -game 1-challenger and send it to T 0 .
Receive U " ti 1 , . . . , i u u Ď rns from T 0 and send it to the challenger. Forward the obtained response ps i q iPrnszU to T 0 . Queries. Forward T 0 's queries pi, t, d i q with i P U, t P T, d i P D to the challenger, forward the response c i,t to T 0 . Challenge. T 0 chooses t˚P T such that no encryption query at t˚was made and queries two adjacent tuples pd r0s i q iPU , pd r1s i q iPU . Choose a realisation y of Y according to Exp 2 . Set p " PrrB 1{2 " 0|Y " ys and choose px ras i q iPU with probability Prr p X 2 " px ras i q iPU |B 1{2 " a, Y " ys for a " 0, 1 according to Exp 2 . Send p, t˚, px r0s i , x r1s i q iPU to the challenger. Obtain the response pc i,t˚qiPU and forward it to T 0 . Queries. T 0 can make the same type of queries as before with the restriction that no encryption query at t˚can be made. Guess. T 0 gives a guess about the encrypted database. Output the same guess.
The rules of P -game 1 are preserved, since T 1,P sends two tuples of the same aggregate y to its challenger. On the other hand, since the ciphertexts generated by the challenger are determined by the challenge bit and the collection px rbs i q iPU , the rules of game 0 are preserved by Lemma 3 (the triple pb, px rbs i q iPU , yq is chosen according to Exp 2 ). Therefore T 1,P perfectly simulates game 0 and has the same advantage as T 0 .
[ \ We now show that a secure PSA scheme is also P -secure for every p P p0, 1q, where P " maxtp, 1´pu.
Lemma 5
Let κ be a security parameter. For any p P p0, 1q let T 1,P be an adversary in P -game 1 with advantage µ 1,P pκq ą negpκq. Then there exists an adversary T 1 in game 1 with advantage µ 1 pκq ą negpκq.
Proof. Given a successful adversary T 1,P in P -game 1, we construct a successful adversary T 1 in game 1 as follows:
Setup. Receive κ, pp, T, s 0 from the game 1-challenger and send it to T 1,P . Receive U Ď rns from T 1,P and send it to the challenger. Forward the obtained response ps i q iPrnszU to T 1,P . Queries. Forward T 1,P 's queries pi, t, x i q with i P U, t P T, x i P p D to the challenger, forward the response c i,t to T 1,P . Challenge. T 1,P chooses t˚P T such that no encryption query at t˚was made, sends p P p0, 1q and queries two different tuples px
Choose a bit a with Prra " 0s " p, Prra " 1s " 1´p and query px ras i q iPU , px i q iPU to the challenger, where
Obtain the response pc i,t˚qiPU and forward it to T 1,P . Queries. T 1,P can make the same type of queries as before with the restriction that no encryption query at t˚can be made. Guess. T 1,P gives a guess about a. If it is correct, output 0; else, output 1.
If T 1,P has output the correct guess about a then T 1 can say with high confidence that the challenge ciphertexts are the encryptions of px ras i q iPU and therefore outputs 0. On the other hand, if T 1,P 's guess was not correct, then T 1 can say with high confidence that the challenge ciphertexts are the encryptions of the random collection px i q iPU and it outputs 1. Formally: Case 1. Let pc i,t˚qiPU " pPSAEnc si px ras iiPU . Then T 1 perfectly simulates Pgame 1 for T 1,P and the distribution of ciphers is the same as in P -game 1:
PrrT 1 outputs 0s " p¨PrrT 1,P outputs 0 | a " 0s p1´pq¨PrrT 1,P outputs 1 | a " 1s
" PrrT 1,P wins P -game 1s " P`µ 1,P pκq. Case 2. Let pc i,t˚qiPU " pPSAEnc si px iiPU . Then the ciphertexts are random with the constraint that their product is the same as in the first case. The probability that T 1,P wins game 1 is at most P and PrrT 1 outputs 1s " p¨PrrT 1,P outputs 1 | a " 0s`p1´pq¨PrrT 1,P outputs 0 | a " 1s¨p1´pq " PrrT 1,P loses P -game 1s ě 1´P.
Finally we obtain that the advantage of T 1 in winning game 1 is
[ \ Proof of CDP. We have shown that no probabilistic polynomial-time adversary can win game 0 if the underlying PSA scheme is secure. If the perturbation process in game 0 preserves ǫ-DP, then the whole construction provides ǫ-CDP, as we show now.
Theorem 6 (DP and AO2 give CDP) Let A be a mechanism for a query f D : D n Ñ O which preserves ǫ-DP and let Σ be a PSA scheme for f D that achieves AO2. Then A preserves ǫ-CDP if it is used for the perturbation process in game 0 instantiated with Σ.
Proof. Consider again game 1, P -game 1 and game 0. We first bound the probability p " PrrB 1{2 " 0|Y " ys for the biased coin in P -game 1. Since the perturbation process was performed by A, the random variable Y corresponds to the output of A and we have e´ǫ¨PrrY " y|B 1{2 " 0s ď PrrY " y|B 1{2 " 1s ď e ǫ¨P rrY " y|B 1{2 " 0s.
By the Bayes rule we get p min :" 1 1`e ǫ ď p ď e ǫ 1`e ǫ ": p max . Now let T be a probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine. Let T 1,P denote this Turing machine as adversary in the P -game 1 for any P " maxtp, 1´pu with p P rp min , p max s and let T 1 denote the same Turing machine as adversary in game 1. Let finally D CDP " T 0 denote the same machine as adversary in game 0. Then for a " 0, 1:
ď p max¨P rrT 1 " a|B 1{2 " 0s`negpκq " p max¨P rrT 1,P " a|B p " 0s`negpκq
ď p max p min¨P rrT 1,P " a, B p " 0s`negpκq " e ǫ¨P rrT 1,P " a, B p " 0s`negpκq " e ǫ¨P rrD CDP " a, B 1{2 " 0s`negpκq.
Equations (1) and (4) hold because of Lemma 4 and Equations (2) and (3) hold because of Lemma 5. It follows that PrrD CDP " a|B 1{2 " 1s ď e ǫ¨P rrD CDP " a|B 1{2 " 0s`negpκq.
[ \ As mentioned in the beginning of this section, we consider a mechanism preserving ǫ-DP given some event Good. Therefore, also Theorem 6 applies to this mechanism given Good. Accordingly, the mechanism unconditionally preserves pǫ, δq-CDP, where δ is a bound on the probability that Good does not occur.
A Weak PRF for CDP based on DLWE
We are ready to show how Theorem 2 contributes to build a prospective postquantum secure PSA scheme for differentially private data analyses with a relatively high accuracy. Concretely, we can build a secure PSA scheme from the DLWE assumption with errors sampled according to the symmetric Skellam distribution. These errors automatically provide enough noise to preserve DP.
The Skellam Mechanism for Differential Privacy
In this section we recall the geometric mechanism from [17] and the binomial mechanism from [15] and introduce the Skellam mechanism. Since these mechanisms make use of a discrete probability distribution, they are well-suited for an execution through a secure PSA scheme, thereby preserving CDP as shown in the last section.
Definition 8 (Symmetric Skellam Distribution [33])
Let µ ą 0. A discrete random variable X is drawn according to the symmetric Skellam distribution with parameter µ (short: X Ð Skpµq) if its probability distribution function ψ µ : Z Þ Ñ R is ψ µ pkq " e´µI k pµq, where I k is the modified Bessel function of the first kind (see [1] ).
A random variable X Ð Skpµq can be generated as the difference of two Poisson variables with mean µ, (see [33] ) and is therefore efficiently samplable. We use the fact that the sum of independent Skellam random variables is a Skellam random variable.
Lemma 7 (Reproducibility of Skpµq [33]
) Let X Ð Skpµ 1 q and Y Ð Skpµ 2 q be independent random variables. Then Z :" X`Y is distributed according to Skpµ 1`µ2 q.
An induction step shows that the sum of n i.i.d. symmetric Skellam variables with variance µ is a symmetric Skellam variable with variance nµ. The proofs of the following two Theorems are based on standard concentration inequalities and are provided in Section B of the appendix.
Theorem 8 (Skellam Mechanism)
Let ǫ ą 0. For every database D P D n and query f with sensitivity Spf q the randomised mechanism ApDq :
logp1{δq`ǫ 1´coshpǫ{Spf qq`pǫ{Spf qq¨sinhpǫ{Spf.
Remark 1
The bound on µ from Theorem 8 is smaller than 2¨pSpf q{ǫq 2l ogp1{δq, thus the standard deviation ? µ of Y Ð Skpµq may be assumed to be linear in Spf q¨alogp1{δq{ǫ.
Executing this mechanism through a PSA scheme requires the use of the known constant γ which denotes the a priori estimate of the lower bound on the fraction of uncompromised users. For this case, we provide the accuracy bound for the Skellam mechanism.
Theorem 9 (Accuracy of the Skellam Mechanism) Let ǫ ą 0, 0 ă δ ă 1, Spf q ą 0 and let 0 ă γ ă 1 be the a priori estimate of the lower bound on the fraction of uncompromised users in the network. By distributing the execution of a perturbation mechanism as described above and using the parameters from Theorem 8, we obtain pα, βq-accuracy with α "
Spf q ǫ¨ˆ1 γ¨ˆl ogˆ1 δ˙`ǫ˙`l ogˆ2 β˙˙. Theorem 9 shows that for constant δ, β, γ the error of the Skellam mechanism is bounded by OpSpf q{ǫq. This is the same bound as for the geometric mechanism (see Theorem 3 in [32] ) and the binomial mechanism from [15] . Therefore, the Skellam mechanism has the same accuracy as known solutions. In Figure 1 , an empirical comparison between the mechanisms shows that the error of the geometric and the Skellam mechanisms have a very similar behaviour for both variables δ and γ, while the error of the binomial mechanism is roughly three times larger. On the other hand, as pointed out in Section 2.1, the execution of the geometric mechanism through a PSA scheme requires each user to generate full noise with a small probability. Complementary, the Skellam mechanism allows all users to simply generate noise of small variance. This fact makes the Skellam mechanism tremendously advantageous over the geometric mechanism, since it permits to construct a PSA scheme based on the DLWE problem, which automatically preserves CDP without any loss in the accuracy compared to state-of-the-art solutions.
Hardness of the LWE problem with Errors following the symmetric Skellam distribution
For constructing a secure PSA scheme, we consider the following λ-bounded (Decisional) Learning with Errors problem and prove the subsequent result.
Definition 9 (λ-bounded LWE)
Let κ be a security parameter, let λ " λpκq " polypκq and q " qpκq ě 2 be integers and let χ be a distribution on Z q . Let x Ð UpZ κ, let A Ð UpZ λˆκand let e Ð χ λ . The goal of the LWEpκ, λ, q, χq problem is, given pA, Ax`eq, to find x. The goal of the DLWEpκ, λ, q, χq problem is, given pA, yq, to decide whether y " Ax`e or y " u with u Ð UpZ λ.
Theorem 10 (LWE with Skellam-distributed errors)
Let κ be a security parameter and let λ " λpκq " polypκq with λ ą 3κ. Let q " qpκq " polypκq be a sufficiently large prime modulus and ρ ą 0 such that ρq ě 4λ ? κs. If there exists a ppt algorithm that solves the LWEpκ, λ, q, Skppρqq 2 {4qq problem with more than negligible probability, then there exists an efficient quantumalgorithm that approximates the decisional shortest vector problem (GapSVP) and the shortest independent vectors problem (SIVP) to withinÕpλκ{ρq in the worst case.
Based on the same assumptions, the decisional problem DLWEpκ, λ, q, Skppρqq 2 {4qq is also hard due to the search-to-decision reduction from [26] . Basic notions and facts about the LWE problem can be found in Section C of the appendix. As mentioned in the introduction, our proof uses ideas by Döttling and Müller-Quade [13] . Similarly to their work, we construct a lossy code for the symmetric Skellam distribution from the LWE problem where the errors are taken from the discrete Gaussian distribution Dpνq with parameter ν. Variants of lossy codes were first used in [29] and since then had applications in different hardness reductions, such as the reduction from the LWE problem to the Learning with Rounding problem from [3] . Lossy codes are pseudo-random codes such that the encoding of a message with the addition of certain errors obliterates any information about the message. On the other hand, encoding the same message using a truly random code and adding the same type of error preserves the message. We will conclude that recovering the message when encoding it with a random code and adding Skellam noise must be computationally hard. If this was not the case, lossy codes could be efficiently distinguished from random codes, contradicting the pseudo-randomness-property of lossy codes. 5 Since the Skellam distribution is both reproducible and well-suited for preserving differential privacy (see Theorem 8), the error terms in our DLWE-based PSA scheme are used for two tasks: establishing the cryptographic security of the scheme and the distributed noise generation to preserve differential privacy. As observed in [13] , considering a λ-bounded LWE problem, where the adversary is given λpκq " polypκq samples, poses no restrictions to most cryptographic applications of the LWE problem, since they require only an a priori fixed number of samples. In our application to differential privacy, we identify λ with the number of queries in a pre-defined time-series.
Entropy and Lossy Codes. We introduce the conditional min-entropy as starting point for our technical tools. It can be seen as a measure of ambiguity.
Definition 10 (Conditional min-entropy [13])
Let χ be a probability distribution with finite support Supppχq and let X,X Ð χ. Let f, g be two (possibly randomised) maps on the domain Supppχq. The pf, gq-conditional min-entropy H 8 pX | f pXq " gpXqq of X is defined as
In the remainder of the work we consider f " f A,e and g " g A,e as maps to the set of LWE instances, i.e. f A,e pyq " g A,e pyq " Ay`e.
In this work, we consider the pf A,e , f A,ẽ q-conditional min-entropy rx " ξ | Ax`e " Ax`ẽs *ȯ f a random variable x, i.e. the min-entropy of x given that a LWE instance generated with pA, x, eq is equal to another LWE instance generated with pA,x,ẽq. Now we provide the notion of lossy codes, which is the main technical tool used in the proof of the hardness result.
Definition 11 (Families of Lossy Codes [13])
Let κ be a security parameter, let λ " λpκq " polypκq and let q " qpκq ě 2 be a modulus, ∆ " ∆pκq and let χ be a distribution on Z q . Let tC κ,λ,q u be a family of distributions, where C κ,λ,q is defined on Z λˆκ q . The distribution family tC κ,λ,q u is ∆-lossy for the error distribution χ, if the following hold:
show that the Rényi divergence between the smoothed distribution χ`Dpνq and χ is sufficiently small (where Dpνq is the discrete Gaussian with parameter ν, such that the corresponding LWE problem is hard). They realise this proof technique for the uniform error distribution χ " U. However, the realisation for the Skellam distribution is technically non-trivial. 
C κ,λ,q is lossy: Let
It is not hard to see that the map-conditional entropy suffices for showing that the existence of a lossy code for the error distribution χ implies the hardness of the LWE problem with error distribution χ.
Theorem 11 (Lossy code gives hard LWE [13])
Let κ be a security parameter, let λ " λpκq " polypκq and let q " qpκq be a modulus. Let the distribution χ on Z q be efficiently samplable. Let ∆ " ∆pκq " ωplogpκqq. Then the LWEpκ, λ, q, χq problem is hard, given that there exists a family tC κ,λ,q u Ď Z λˆκ q of ∆-lossy codes for the error distribution χ.
Thus, for our purposes it suffices to show the existence of a lossy code for the error distribution Skpµq. First, it is easy to show that UpZ λˆκis always non-lossy if the corresponding error distribution χ can be bounded, thus the third property of Definition 11 is satisfied. For the first and the second properties we construct a lossy code for the Skellam distribution as follows. It is essentially the same construction that was used for the uniform error distribution in [13] .
Construction 1 (Lossy code for the symmetric Skellam distribution [35])
Let κ be an even security parameter, let λ " λpκq " polypκq, ν ą 0 and let q " qpκq be a prime modulus. The distribution C κ,λ,q,ν defined on Z λˆκ q is speci-
From the matrix version of the LWE problem and the search-to-decision reduction from [26] (see our Theorem 24), it is straightforward to see that C κ,λ,q,ν is pseudo-random in the sense of Property 1 of Definition 11 assuming the hardness of the LWEpκ, λ, q, Dpνqq problem. It remains to show that Construction 1 satisfies Property 2 of Definition 11. We first state three supporting claims, whose simple proofs are provided in Section C of the appendix. Let A " pA 1 ||A 1 T`Gq be the code as defined in Construction 1. In our further analysis we can consider only G instead of A.
Lemma 13
Let κ be an even integer,
Lemma 14´C`?C 2`1 ě expp´Cq for all C ě 0.
Lemma 15 ([35])
Let κ be a security parameter, let s " spκq " ωplogpκqq and let ν " νpκq " polypκq. Let λ " λpκq " polypκq, 0 ă ζ " ζpκq " polypκq be integers. Let G Ð Dpνq λˆζ . Then for all z P t0, 1u ζ the following hold: . Let s " spκq " ωplogpκqq, let µ " µpκq, let q " polypκq be a sufficiently large prime modulus and let λ " λpκq " polypκq be even. Let e,ẽ Ð Skpµq λ and letξ " arg max ξPZ κ q tPr e re " Aξ`ẽsu. Let u " Aξ`ẽ. Then ||u|| 1 ď λs ? µ with probability 1´negpκq.
We now show the lossiness of Construction 1 for the error distribution Skpµq. 1 [35] ) Let κ be an even security parameter, s " spκq " ωplogpκqq, let ν " νpκq, let q " polypκq be a sufficiently large prime modulus, let λ " λpκq " polypκq and let ∆ " ∆pκq " ωplogpκqq. q and G Ð Dpνq λˆκ{2 . Letẽ " pẽ j q j"1,...,λ Ð Skpµq λ and letξ " arg max ξPZ κ q tPr e re " Aξ`ẽsu. Then we have the following chain of (in)equations: ě Pr
Lemma 17 (Lossiness of Construction
Equation (5) is an application of the Bayes rule and Equation (6) applies, since x is sampled according to a uniform distribution. Equation (7) applies, since maximising over ξ is the same as maximising overx´ξ. Equation (8) is valid since in the denominator we are summing over all possible z P Z κ q . Equation (9) holds by definition ofξ. Equation (10) is an index shift byξ. Inequation (11) follows from essential properties of the modified Bessel functions (iterative application of Lemma 18) . Note that the modified Bessel function of the first kind is symmetric when considered over integer orders. Therefore, from this point of the chain of (in)equations (i.e. from Inequation (11)), we can assume that e j ě 0. Moreover, we can assume that pAzq j ě 0, since otherwise I pAzqj`ẽj pµq ą I´p Azqj`ẽj pµq. I.e. if pAzq j ă 0, then we implicitly change the sign of the j th row in the original matrix A while considering the particular z. In this way, we are always considering the worst-case scenario for every z. Note that this step does not change the distribution of A, since tC κ,λ,q,ν u is symmetric. Inequation (12) holds, since f µ pkq " p´k`ak 2`µ2 q{µ is a monotonically decreasing function. Inequation (13) 
Putting the previous results together, we finally show the hardness of the LWE problem with errors drawn from the symmetric Skellam distribution.
Proof (Proof of Theorem 10). By the hardness of the LWEpκ, λ, q, Dppαqq 2 {p2πproblem (see Theorem 23), the LWEpκ, λ, q, Dpνqq problem is hard for ν " pαqq 2 {p2πq ą 2κ{π, if there exists no efficient quantum algorithm approximating the decisional shortest vector problem (GapSVP) and the shortest independent vectors problem (SIVP) to withinÕpκ{αq in the worst case. Let q " qpκq " polypκq, s " spκq " ωplogpκqq and λ ą 3κ. Then for ∆ " ωplogpκqq, Lemma 12, the pseudo-randomness of Construction 1 and Lemma 17 provide that Construction 1 gives us a family of ∆-lossy codes for the symmetric Skellam distribution with variance µ ě 4λ 2 νs 2 . As observed in Theorem 11, this is sufficient for the hardness of the LWEpκ, λ, q, Skpµqq problem. Setting ρ " 2αλs yields pρqq 2 ą 16λ 2 κs 2 and the claim follows.
By the search-to-decision reduction from [26] we obtain the hardness of the DLWE problem as a corollary.
A CDP-Preserving PSA scheme based on DLWE
Security of the scheme. We can build an instantiation of Theorem 2 (without correct decryption) based on the DLWEpκ, λ, q, χq problem as follows. Set S " M " Z κ q , G " Z q , choose s i Ð UpZ κfor all i " 1, . . . , n and s 0 "´ř n i"1 s i , set F si ptq " xt, s i y`e i (which is a so-called randomised weak pseudo-random function as described in [4] and in [6] ), where e i Ð χ (for the uncompromised users) and let ϕ be the identity function. Therefore
The decryption function is defined by , c 1,t , . . . , c n,t q.
Thus, the decryption is not perfectly correct anymore, but yields a noisy aggregate. Let γ P p0, 1s be the a priori known fraction of uncompromised users in the network. Then we can construct the following DLWE-based PSA schemes.
Example 1
Let χ " Dpν{pγnqq with parameter ν{pγnq " 2κ{π, then the DLWEpκ, λ, q, χq problem is hard and the above scheme is secure.
polypκq with λ ą 3κ, then the DLWEpκ, λ, q, χq problem is hard and the above scheme is secure.
Remark 2
The original result from [31] states that the LWE problem is hard in the set T " R{Z when the noise is distributed according to the continuous Gaussian distribution (with a certain bound on the variance) modulo 1. Although the continuous Gaussian distribution is reproducible as well, it does not seem to fit well for a DLWE-based PSA scheme: For data processing reasons the values would have to be discretised. Therefore the resulting noise would follow a distribution which is not reproducible anymore. 6 Differential privacy of the mechanism. The total noise ř n i"1 e i in Example 2 is distributed according to Skpµq due to Lemma 7. Thus, in contrast to the total noise in Example 1, the total noise in Example 2 preserves the distribution of the single noise and can be used for preserving differential privacy of the correct sum by splitting the task of perturbation among the users. Suppose that adding symmetric Skellam noise with variance µ preserves pǫ, δq-DP. We define µ user " µ{pγnq. Since the Skellam distribution is reproducible, the noise addition can be executed in a distributed manner: each (uncompromised) user simply adds (independent) symmetric Skellam noise with variance µ user to her own value in order to preserve the privacy of the final output. 6 In [9] it was shown that the sum of n discrete Gaussians each with parameter σ is statistically close to a discrete Gaussian with parameter ? nσ if σ ą ? nηpΛq for some smoothing parameter ηpΛq of the underlying lattice Λ. However, this approach is less suitable for our purpose if the number of users is large, since the aggregated decryption outcome would have a an error with a variance of order nσ 2 " Ωpn 2 q (in example 2 the variance is only of order Opλ 2 κnq).
Accuracy of the mechanism. From Theorem 9 we know that the error of the Skellam mechanism executed in a distributed manner among γn uncompromised users does not exceed OpSpf q¨logp1{δq{ǫq with high probability. Theorem 2 indicates that the set T contains all the time-frames where a query can be executed. We identify |T | " λ, i.e. the number of queries is equal to the number of equations in the instance LWE problem. 7 Due to sequential composition 8 , in order to preserve pǫ, δq-DP for all λ queries together, the executed mechanism must preserve pǫ{λ, δq-DP for each query. Therefore the following holds: suppose Skpµ 1 q-noise is sufficient in order to preserve pǫ, δq-DP for a single query. Then, due to Remark 1, we must use Skpλ 2 µ 1 q-noise in order to preserve pǫ, δq-DP for all λ queries. By Theorem 9 the error in each query within T is bounded by OpλSpf ql ogp1{δq{ǫq which is consistent with the effects of sequential composition.
Combining Security, Privacy and Accuracy. Let Spf q " m and for each time-step t P T let the data of each user come from t´m, . . . , mu. For µ " 2¨pmλ{ǫq 2¨l ogp1{δq, it follows from the previous discussion and Remark 1 that if every user adds Skpµ{pγnqq-noise to her data in every time-step t P T , then this suffices to preserve pǫ, δq-DP for all λ sum-queries executed during T . Furthermore, if for a security parameter κ we have that µ{pγnq " λ 2 κ, then we obtain a secure protocol for sum-queries, where the security is based on prospectively hard lattice problems. As we showed in Section 4.2, a combination of these two results provides pǫ, δq-CDP for all λ sum-queries. Now assume that for µ " γnλ 2 κ, every uncompromised user in the network adds Skpµ{pγnqq-noise to her data for each of the λ queries in order to securely encrypt it using the scheme from Example 2. Then there exist ǫ, δ such that the decryption output preserves pǫ, δq-CDP for all λ queries. In order to calculate ǫ and δ we set 2¨pmλ{ǫq 2¨l ogp1{δq " γnλ 2 κ. Hence, for all λ queries the secure scheme preserves pǫ, δq-CDP with ǫ " ǫpκq " b 2m 2¨l ogp1{δq γn¨κ , indicating that ǫ " ǫpκq depends on 1{κ. Note that this is consistent with the original definition of CDP by Mironov et al. [27] . Thus, in addition to a privacy/accuracy trade-off there is also a security/accuracy trade-off. More specifically, depending on κ and n we obtain an upper bound on the pα, βq-accuracy for every single query executed during T :
Finally, we are able to prove our main result, Theorem 1, which follows from the preceding analyses.
Proof (of Theorem 1). The claim follows from Theorem 6 together with Theorem 2 (instantiated with the efficient construction in Example 2) and from Theorem 8 together with Theorem 9.
[ \
Conclusions
In this work we continued a line of research opened by the work of Shi et al. [32] . Using the notion of computational differential privacy, we provided a connection between a secure PSA scheme and a mechanism preserving differential privacy by showing that a differentially private mechanism preserves CDP if it is executed through a secure PSA scheme. This closes a security reduction chain from key-homomorphic weak PRFs to CDP, which was initiated in [36] . After introducing the Skellam mechanism for differential privacy we constructed the first prospective post-quantum PSA scheme for analyses of large data amounts from large amounts of individuals under differential privacy. The theoretic basis of the scheme is the DLWE assumption with Skellam noise that is used both for security of the scheme and for preserving differential privacy.
A Proof of Lemma 3
Proof (of Lemma 3). We observe that in Exp 1 , PrrY " y| p
which exactly corresponds to the conditional probability of p X 2 in Exp 2 . Thus:
B The Skellam mechanism

B.1 Preliminaries
As observed before, the distributed noise generation is feasible with a probability distribution function closed under convolution. For this purpose, we recall the Skellam distribution.
Definition 12 (Skellam Distribution [33])
Let µ 1 , µ 2 ą 0. A discrete random variable X is drawn according to the Skellam distribution with parameters µ 1 , µ 2 (short: X Ð Skpµ 1 , µ 2 q) if it has the following probability distribution function ψ µ1,µ2 : Z Þ Ñ R:
where I k is the modified Bessel function of the first kind (see pages 374-378 in [1] ).
A random variable X Ð Skpµ 1 , µ 2 q has variance µ 1`µ2 and can be generated as the difference of two random variables drawn according to the Poisson distribution of mean µ 1 and µ 2 , respectively (see [33] ). Note that the Skellam distribution is not generally symmetric. However, we mainly consider the particular case µ 1 " µ 2 " µ{2 and refer to this symmetric distribution as Skpµq " Skpµ{2, µ{2q. Suppose that adding symmetric Skellam noise with variance µ preserves pǫ, δq-DP. Recall that the network is given an a priori known estimate γ of the lower bound on the fraction of uncompromised users. We define µ user " µ{pγnq and instruct the users to add symmetric Skellam noise with variance µ user to their own data. If compromised users will not add noise, the total noise will be still sufficient to preserve pǫ, δq-DP by Lemma 7. For our analysis, we use the following bound on the ratio of modified Bessel functions of the first kind. I k pµq [22] ) For real k, let I k pµq be the modified Bessel function of the first kind and order k. Then
Lemma 18 (Bound on
Moreover, we will use the Turán-type inequality on the modified Bessel from [11] .
Lemma 19 (Turán-type inequality [11])
For k ą´1{2, let I k pµq be the modified Bessel function of the first kind and order k. Then for all µ ą 0:
For the privacy analysis of the Skellam mechanism, we need a tail bound on the symmetric Skellam distribution. Proof. We use standard techniques from probability theory. Applying Markov's inequality, for any t ą 0, PrrX ą σµ`τ s " Prre tX ą e tpσµ`τ q s ď
Ere tX s e tpσµ`τ q .
As shown in [20] , for X Ð Skpµq, the moment generating function of X is
where coshptq " pe t`e´t q{2. Hence, we have PrrX ą σµ`τ s ď e´µ p1´coshptq`tσq´tτ .
Fix t " lnpσ`?1`σ 2 q. In order to conclude the proof, we observe that coshplnpσ`?1`σ 2" ? 1`σ 2 .
[ \ One can easily verify that, for σ ą 0, 1´a1`σ 2`σ lnpσ`a1`σ 2 q ą 0.
B.2 Analysis of the Skellam mechanism
In this section, we prove the bound on the variance µ of the symmetric Skellam distribution as stated in Theorem 8 that is needed in order to preserve pǫ, δqdifferential privacy and we compute the error that is thus produced.
Privacy analysis.
Proof (of Theorem 8). Let D 0 , D 1 P D n be adjacent databases with |f pD 0 qf pD 1 q| ď Spf q. The largest ratio between PrrA Sk pD 0 q " Rs and PrrA Sk pD 1 q " Rs is reached when k :" R´f pD 0 q " R´f pD 1 q´Spf q ě 0, where R is any possible output of A Sk . Then, by Lemma 18, for all possible outputs R of A Sk :
Inequality (16) holds if k ď sinhpǫ{Spf qq¨µ´Spf q, since it implies k ď sinhpǫ{Spf qqμ´j and therefore μ pk`jq`apk`jq 2`µ2 ď e ǫ{Spf q for all j " 1, . . . , Spf q. Applying Lemma 20 with σ " sinhpǫ{Spfand τ " Spf q, we get Prrk ą sinhpǫ{Spf qq¨µ´Spf qs ď e´µ¨p 1´coshpǫ{Spf qq`pǫ{Spf qq¨sinhpǫ{Spf`ǫ and this expression is set to be smaller or equal than δ. This inequality is satisfied if µ ě logp1{δq`ǫ 1´coshpǫ{Spf qq`pǫ{Spf qq¨sinhpǫ{Spf.
Accuracy analysis.
Proof (of Theorem 9). Let µ " logp1{δq`ǫ 1´coshpǫ{Spf qq`pǫ{Spf qq¨sinhpǫ{Spfbe the bound on the variance for the Skellam mechanism provided in Theorem 8 and let the random variable Y denote the total noise induced by the mechanism. As in the proof of Lemma 20 and since Y Ð Skpµq, for α 1 ą 0, Prr|Y | ą α 1 s " 2¨PrrY ą α 1 s ď 2¨e´µ¨p 1´coshpǫ{Spf´pǫ{Spf qq¨α 1 and this expression is set to be equal to β. Solving this equality for α 1 yields
[ \ For the distributed noise generation, each single user adds symmetric Skellam noise with variance µ user " µ{pγnq to her data. The worst case for accuracy is when all n users add noise, thus the total noise Y is a symmetric Skellam variable with variance µ{γ and the accuracy becomes
proving Theorem 9.
C Additional details for Section 5.2
In this section we will provide more notions and facts about the LWE problem and more details for the proof of Theorem 10.
C.1 Learning with Errors.
In most of the results about lattice-based cryptography the LWE problem is considered with errors sampled according to a discrete Gaussian distribution.
Definition 13 (Discrete Gaussian distribution [31])
Let q be an integer and let Φ s denote the normal distribution with variance s 2 {p2πq. Let Ψ α denote the discretised Gaussian distribution with variance pαqq 2 {p2πq, i.e. Ψ α is sampled by taking a sample from Φ αq and performing a randomised rounding (see [6] ). Let Dpνq be the discretised Gaussian distribution with variance ν, i.e. Dpνq " Ψ ? 2πν{q .
We consider a λ-bounded LWE problem, where the adversary is given λpκq " polypκq samples (which we can write conveniently in matrix-form). As observed in [13] , this consideration poses no restrictions to most cryptographic applications of the LWE problem, since they require only an a priori fixed number of samples. In our application to differential privacy (see Section 5) we identify λ with the number of queries in a pre-defined time-series. Problem 1. λ-bounded LWE Search Problem, Average-Case Version. Let κ be a security parameter, let λ " λpκq " polypκq and q " qpκq ě 2 be integers and let χ be a distribution on Z q . Let x Ð UpZ κ, let A Ð UpZ λˆκand let e Ð χ λ . The goal of the LWEpκ, λ, q, χq problem is, given pA, Ax`eq, to find x. Problem 2. λ-bounded LWE Distinguishing Problem. Let κ be a security parameter, let λ " λpκq " polypκq and q " qpκq ě 2 be integers and let χ be a distribution on Z q . Let x Ð UpZ κ, let A Ð UpZ λˆκand let e Ð χ λ . The goal of the DLWEpκ, λ, q, χq problem is, given pA, yq, to decide whether y " Ax`e or y " u with u Ð UpZ λ.
C.2 Basic Facts
Facts about the used Distributions. We need to find a tail bound for the sum of discrete Gaussian variables such that the tail probability is negligible.
Lemma 21 (Bound for the sum of discrete Gaussian variables)
Let κ be a security parameter, let s " spκq " ωplogpκqq and let ν " νpκq " polypκq. Let ζ " ζpκq ą 0 be an integer. Let g 1 , . . . , g ζ Ð Dpνq. Then
Pr " |g 1`. . .`g ζ | ą a ζνs ı ď negpκq.
Proof. Since g 1 , . . . , g ζ are independent sub-Gaussian random variables with sub-Gaussian parameter ? ν, the result follows from an application of the Hoeffdingtype inequality for sub-Gaussian random variables (see Proposition 5.10 in [37] ).
[ \ Moreover, we need a proper lower bound on the symmetric Skellam distribution that holds with probability exponentially close to 0.
Lemma 22 (Bound on the Skellam distribution)
Let κ be a security parameter, let s " spκq " ωplogpκqq and let µ " µpκq " polypκq with µ ą s ą 0. Let X Ð Skpµq. Then PrrX ą s ? µs ď negpκq.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 20. Applying the Laplace transform and the Markov's inequality we obtain for any t ą 0, PrrX ą s ? µs " Prre tX ą e ts ? µ s ď Ere tX s e ts ? µ .
As for the proof of Lemma 20, we use the moment generating function of X Ð Skpµq, which is Ere tX s " e´µ p1´coshptqq , where coshptq " pe t`e´t q{2. Hence, we have PrrX ą s ? µs ď e´µ p1´coshptqq´ts ? µ ă e´s p1´coshptqq´ts 3{2 . "negpκq.
To see the last inequality, observe that the function f psq " s¨p a 1`1{s´?s arsinhp1{ ? sqq is monotonically increasing and its limit is 2{3.
[ \ Facts about Learning with Errors. Regev [31] established worst-to-average case connections between conjecturally hard lattice problems and the LWEpκ, λ, q, Dpνqq problem.
Theorem 23 (Worst-to-Average Case [31] ) Let κ be a security parameter and let q " qpκq be a modulus, let α " αpκq P p0, 1q be such that αq ą 2 ? κ. If there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm solving the LWEpκ, λ, q, Dppαqq 2 {p2πproblem with non-negligible probability, then there exists an efficient quantum algorithm that approximates the decisional shortest vector problem (GAPSVP) and the shortest independent vectors problem (SIVP) to withinÕpκ{αq in the worst case.
We use the search-to-decision reduction from [26] basing the hardness of Problem 2 on the hardness of Problem 1 which works for any error distribution χ and is sample preserving.
Theorem 24 (Search-to-Decision [26])
Let κ be a security parameter, q " qpκq " polypκq a prime modulus and let χ be any distribution on Z q . Assume there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time distinguisher that solves the DLWEpκ, λ, q, χq problem with non-negligible success-probability, then there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary that solves the LWEpκ, λ, q, χq problem with non-negligible success-probability.
Finally, we provide a matrix version of Problem 2. The hardness of this version can be shown by using a hybrid argument as pointed out in [13] .
Lemma 25 (Matrix version of LWE)
Let κ be a security parameter, λ " λpκq " polypκq, κ 1 " κ 1 pκq " polypκq. Assume that the DLWEpκ, λ, q, χq problem is hard. Then pA, AX`Eq is pseudo-random, where A Ð UpZ λˆκ, X Ð UpZ κˆκ 1and E Ð χ λˆκ 1 .
Facts about Lossy Codes. We will use the fact that the existence of a lossy code (Definition 11) for an error distribution implies the hardness of the associated decoding problems. This means that solving the LWE problem is hard even though with overwhelming probability the secret is information-theoretically unique. The result was shown in [13] .
Proof (of Theorem 11) . Due to the non-lossiness of UpZ λˆκfor χ, instances of LWEpκ, λ, q, χq have a unique solution with probability 1´negpκq. Now, let T be a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary solving the LWEpκ, λ, q, χq problem with non-negligible probability σ. Using T , we will construct a probabilistic polynomial-time distinguisher D LWE distinguishing UpZ λˆκand tC κ,λ,q u with non-negligible advantage. Let A P Z λˆκ be the input of D LWE . It must decide whether A Ð UpZ λˆκor A Ð tC κ,λ,q u. Therefore, D LWE samplesx Ð UpZ κ q andẽ Ð χ λ . It runs T on input pA, Ax`ẽq. Then T outputs some x P Z κ . If x "x, then D LWE outputs 1, otherwise it outputs 0. If A Ð UpZ λˆκ, thenx is unique and then x "x with probability σ. Therefore PrrD LWE pAq " 1 | A Ð UpZ λˆκs " σ.
If A Ð tC κ,λ,q u, then T outputs the correct value with probability
Prrx "x | Ax`e " Ax`ẽs " 2´H f A,e ,f A,ẽ ,x pxq ď 2´∆, with f B,b pyq " By`b. This holds with probability 1´negpκq over the choice of pA,x,ẽq. This probability is negligible in κ, since ∆ " ωplogpκqq. Therefore PrrD LWE pAq " 1 | A Ð tC κ,λ,q us " negpκq and in conclusion D LWE distinguishes UpZ λˆκand tC κ,λ,q u with probability at least σ´negpκq, which is non-negligible.
[ \ We will use the fact that UpZ λˆκis always non-lossy if the corresponding error distribution χ can be bounded, as provided in Lemma 12.
C.3 Additional Proofs for the Hardness Result
We provide the proofs of the supporting Lemma 13, Lemma 14 and Lemma 15.
Proof (of Lemma 13). Define r T "ˆI T 0 I˙.
Note that r
T P Z κˆκ q is a non-singular matrix. For all x P Z κ{2 q set x 1 " r T´1p 0 tr ||x tr q tr . Then Ax 1 "pA 1 ||A 1 T`Gq¨x 1 "pA 1 ||Gq¨r T¨r T´1¨p0 tr ||x tr q tr "pA 1 ||Gq¨p0 tr ||x tr q tr "Gx.
[ \ Proof (of Lemma 14) . Let f pCq " p´C`?C 2`1 q exppCq. Then f pCq is monotonically increasing and f p0q " 1¨p´0`?0`1q " 1.
[ \ .
Let ||u|| 1 " C andũ " prC{λs, rC{λs, . . . , tC{λu, tC{λuq tr , i.e.ũ is maximally balanced with ||ũ|| 1 " C (ceiling C{λ for the first components ofũ and flooring for the last ones). First, we show that under all vectors with L 1 -norm C, the vectorũ has the maximal probability weight, i.e. we show that Pr e re "ũs " max .
The difference between the largest and the smallest component inũ is at most 1 (it is 0 iff C is a multiple of λ). Let w be any less balanced vector thanũ with ||w|| 1 " C, i.e. let the difference between the largest and the smallest component in w be at least 2. Then there exist indices i 1 , i 2 P rλs, such that w i2´wi1 ě 2.
We construct a vectorw with the following components:
Then, due to Lemma 19, we have that Pr e re "ws ą Pr e re " ws. If we iterate this argument until we consider a maximally balanced vector (i.e. a vector with a difference of at most 1 between its largest and its smallest component), we obtain Pr e re "ũs ą Pr e re " ws.
This implies Equation (18) . Now assume that C ą λs ? µ. Then, by the previous claim, we have thatũ j ě ts ?
µu for each componentũ j ofũ, j " 1, . . . , λ. Since by Lemma 22, a Skellam variable is bounded by ts ? µu with overwhelming probability, we have Pr e re "ẽs ą Pr e re "ũs (18) ě Pr e re " us with overwhelming probability over the choice ofẽ, which is a contradiction to Equation (17) .
